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Abstract
Social influence has been shown to create significant unpredictability in cultural markets,
providing one potential explanation why experts routinely fail at predicting commercial suc-
cess of cultural products. As a result, social influence is often presented in a negative light.
Here, we show the benefits of social influence for cultural markets. We present a policy that
uses product quality, appeal, position bias and social influence to maximize expected profits
in the market. Our computational experiments show that our profit-maximizing policy lever-
ages social influence to produce significant performance benefits for the market, while our
theoretical analysis proves that our policy outperforms in expectation any policy not display-
ing social signals. Our results contrast with earlier work which focused on showing the un-
predictability and inequalities created by social influence. Not only do we show for the first
time that, under our policy, dynamically showing consumers positive social signals in-
creases the expected profit of the seller in cultural markets. We also show that, in reason-
able settings, our profit-maximizing policy does not introduce significant unpredictability and
identifies “blockbusters”. Overall, these results shed new light on the nature of social influ-
ence and how it can be leveraged for the benefits of the market.
Introduction
Prediction in cultural markets is a wicked problem: On the one hand, experts routinely fail at
predicting commercial success for items such as movies, books, and songs [1–5] while, on the
other hand, hit products are generally considered qualitatively superior to the less successful
ones [6]. If those hit products are of superior quality, why can’t experts detect them a priori?
As Duncan Watts puts it, in cultural markets “everything is obvious . . . once you know the an-
swer,” as experts find it extremely hard to benefit from their specific knowledge [7].
In their seminal paper [8], Salganik, Dodds, and Watts offer a satisfactory explanation for
this paradox: The impact of social influence on the behavior of individuals (word-of-mouth), a
process a priori invisible to experts, may distort the quality perceived by the customers, making
quality and popularity out of sync and expert predictions less reliable. To investigate this
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hypothesis experimentally, they created an artificial music market called the MUSICLAB. Partici-
pants in the MUSICLAB were presented a list of unknown songs from unknown bands, each
song being described by its name and band. The participants were divided into two groups ex-
posed to two different experimental conditions: The independent condition and the social influ-
ence condition. In the first group (independent condition), participants were provided with no
additional information about the songs. Each participant would decide which song to listen to
from a random list. After listening to a song, the participant had the opportunity to download
it. In the second group (social influence condition), each participant was provided with an ad-
ditional information: The number of times the song was downloaded by earlier participants.
Moreover, these participants were presented with a list ordered by the number of downloads.
Additionally, to investigate the impact of social influence, participants in the second group
were distributed in eight “worlds” evolving completely independently. In particular, partici-
pants in one world had no visibility about the downloads and the rankings in the other worlds.
The MUSICLAB provides an experimental testbed of measuring the unpredictability of cultur-
al markets. By observing the evolution of different words given the same initial conditions, the
MUSICLAB provides unique insights on the impact of social influence and the resulting unpre-
dictability. In particular, Salganik et al suggested that social influence contributes to both un-
predictability and inequality of success, with follow-up experiments confirming these initial
findings [9–12] (see also [13] for a perspective on the MUSICLAB paper). These experimental re-
sults received further theoretical support by the development of a generative model that repro-
duces the experimental data [14]. The MUSICLAB model, which is presented below, teased out
the role of the quality and appeal of the songs and position bias in the unpredictability and in-
equality of the experimental market.
Together these results painted a bleak scenario for cultural markets. From the standpoint of
the market, e.g., producers and consumers of cultural products, this is an inefficient situation
[15–17]: Fewer cultural products are consumed overall and some high-quality products may
go unnoticed, while lower-quality ones are oversold. It is thus an important open question to
determine whether this situation can be remedied and how. In [6], Watts advocates the use of
“measure and react” strategies to address the difficulty in making correct predictions: “Rather
than predicting how people will behave and attempting to design ways to make customers be-
have in a particular way [. . .] we can instead measure directly how they respond to a whole
range of possibilities and react accordingly” [6]. The MUSICLAB provides a unique setting to val-
idate the benefits of a “measure and react” strategy.
This paper presents a “measure and optimize” (M&O) algorithm, that is a “measure and
react” algorithm which maximizes expected downloads at each decision point. In the MUSI-
CLAB, the only degree of freedom is the playlist presented to an incoming participant. Each
ranking policy for the playlist produces a “measure and react” algorithm. The original MUSI-
CLAB experiments presented one such policy: To rank the songs by number of downloads. Our
“measure and optimize” algorithm in contrast uses a performance ranking that maximizes the
expected downloads globally for the incoming participant, exploiting the quality and appeal of
each song, the position visibilities in the playlist, and social influence. The M&O algorithm is
based on three technical insights.
1. It uses the generative MUSICLAB model that describes the probability of sampling a song
given its quality, appeal, position in the playlist, and the downloads of all songs at some
point in time.
2. It solves the resulting global optimization problem in strongly polynomial time by a reduc-
tion, which means that the algorithm scales to large instances and avoid exploring the n!
possible rankings.
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3. Since the quality of the songs is not known a priori, the algorithm learns them over time,
using an often overlooked insight by Salganik et al. [8]: The fact that the popularity of a
song in the independent condition is a natural measure of its quality, capturing both its in-
trinsic “value” and the preferences of the participants.
The M&O algorithm was evaluated on a simulated version of the MUSICLAB based on the model
proposed in [14]; It was compared to the download ranking policy used in the original MUSI-
CLAB experiments [8] and a random ranking policy. These ranking policies were evaluated both
under the social influence and independent conditions.
Regarding market efficiency, the computational results contain two important highlights:
1. The M&O algorithm produces a significant increase in expected downloads compared to
other tested policies.
2. The M&O algorithm leverages both position bias and social influence to maximize down-
loads, providing substantial gains compared to ranking policies under the
independent condition.
These performance results are robust, not an artifact of distributions and parameters used in
experimental setting. Indeed, our theoretical results show that a performance-ranking policy
always benefits from social influence and outperforms all policies not using social influence in
expectation regardless of the distributions for the appeal and quality of the songs. The perfor-
mance results also shed light on recent results that demonstrated the benefits of position bias
in the absence of social influence [18]. Our computational results show that a performance-
ranking policy leverages both social influence and position visibility and that the improvements
in expected downloads are cumulative.
Regarding unpredictability, our results are also illuminating. They highlight that the perfor-
mance-ranking policy often identifies “blockbusters”, which are the primary sources of the in-
creased market efficiency. This provides a sharp contrast to the download ranking, which
cannot identify these blockbusters reliably. Moreover, even in a worst-case scenario where the
appeal is negatively with quality, our computational results show that the performance ranking
brings significant benefits over the download ranking.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the performance-ranking policy is general-purpose
and can be applied to a variety of cultural markets, including books and movies, where product
appeal, position visibility, and social influence can be optimized jointly.
Results
We first describe the MUSICLAB model proposed in [14], the experimental setting, and a presen-
tation of the various ranking policies. We then show how to estimate the qualities of the songs.
We then report the core computational results about the market efficiency, unpredictability,
and inequality produced by the various ranking policies. We finally prove that social influence
always helps the performance ranking in maximizing the expected downloads. As a result, the
performance ranking under social influence outperforms all ranking policies under the
independent condition.
The MUSICLAB Model
The descriptive model for the MUSICLAB [14] is based on the data collected during the actual ex-
periments and is accurate enough to reproduce the conclusions in [8] through simulation. The
model is defined in terms of a market composed of n songs. Each song i 2 {1, . . ., n} is charac-
terized by two values:
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1. Its appeal Ai which represents the inherent preference of listening to song i based only on its
name and its band;
2. Its quality qi which represents the conditional probability of downloading song i given that
it was sampled.
The MUSICLAB experiments present each participant with a playlist π, i.e., a permutation of
{1, . . ., n}. Each position p in the playlist is characterized by its visibility vp which is the inherent
probability of sampling a song in position p. Since the playlist π is a bijection from the positions
to the songs, its inverse is well-defined and is called a ranking. Rankings are denoted by the let-
ter σ in the following, πi denotes the song in position i of the playlist π, and σi denotes the posi-
tion of song i in the ranking σ. Hence vσi denotes the visibility of the position of song i. The
model specifies the probability of listening to song i at time k given a playlist σ as
pi;kðsÞ ¼
vsiðaAi þ Di;kÞPn
j¼1 vsjðaAj þ Dj;kÞ
;
where Di,k is the number of downloads of song i at time k and α> 0 is a scaling factor which is
the same for all songs. Observe that the probability of sampling a song depends on its position
in the playlist, its appeal, and the number of downloads at time k. As an experiment proceeds,
the number of downloads dominates the appeal of the song at a rate dictated by α.
When simulating the independent condition, the download counts Di,k in the probability pi,
k(σ) becomes zero and hence the probability of listening to song i only depends on the appeals
and visibilities of the songs. We obtain a probability
piðsÞ ¼
vsiAiPn
j¼1 vsjAj
The Experimental Setting
The experimental setting in this paper uses an agent-based simulation to emulate the MUSI-
CLAB. Each simulation consists of N iterations and, at each iteration k,
1. the simulator randomly selects a song i according to the probability distribution specified by
the pj.k’s.
2. the simulator randomly determines, with probability qi, whether selected song i is down-
loaded; If the song is downloaded, then the simulator increases the download counts of song
i, i.e., Di,k+1 = Di,k+1.
The “measure and react” algorithms studied in this paper monitors the above process (e.g., to
estimate song quality). Every r iterations, the algorithms compute a new playlist σ using one of
the ranking policies described below. For instance, in the social influence condition of the origi-
nal MUSICLAB experiments, the policy ranks the songs in decreasing order of download counts.
The parameter r 1 is called the refresh rate.
The experimental setting tries to be close to the MUSICLAB experiments and considers 50
songs and simulations with 20,000 steps. The songs are displayed in a single column. The anal-
ysis in [14] indicated that participants are more likely to sample songs higher in the playlist.
More precisely, the visibility decreases with the playlist position, except for a slight increase at
the bottom positions. Fig. 1 depicts the visibility profile based on these guidelines, which is
used in all computational experiments in this paper.
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The paper also uses two settings for the quality and appeal of each song, which are depicted
in Fig. 2:
1. In the first setting, the quality and the appeal for the songs were chosen independently ac-
cording to a Gaussian distribution normalized to fit between 0 and 1.
2. The second setting explores an extreme case where the appeal of a song is negatively corre-
lated with its quality. The quality of each song is the same as in the first setting but the ap-
peal is chosen such that the sum of appeal and quality is exactly 1.
The experimental results were obtained by runningW = 400 simulations.
The Ranking Policies
This section reviews a number of ranking policies used to influence the participants. Each poli-
cy updates the order of the songs in the playlist and thus defines a different “measure and
react” algorithm that uses the policy to present a novel playlist after each refresh.
The first policy is called the download ranking [8]: At iteration k, it simply orders the songs
by the number of downloads Di,k and assigns the positions 1..n in that order to obtain the sdk .
Note that downloads do not necessarily reflect the inherent quality of the songs, since they de-
pend on how many times the songs were listened to.
The second policy is the performance ranking which maximizes the expected number of
downloads at each iteration, exploiting all the available information globally, i.e., the appeal,
the visibility, the downloads, and the quality of the songs.
Definition 1. The performance ranking sk at iteration k is defined as
sk ¼ arg-max
s2Sn
Xn
i¼1
pi;kðsÞ  qi:
Fig 1. The visibility Vp (y-axis) of position p in the playlist (x-axis) where p = 1 is the top position and
p = 50 is the bottom position of the playlist which is displayed in a single column.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g001
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The performance ranking uses the probability pi,k(σ) of sampling song i at iteration k given
ranking σ, as well as the quality qi of song i. Obviously, in practical situations, the song qualities
are unknown. However, as mentioned in the introduction, Salganik et al. [8] argue that the
popularity of a song (at least in the independent condition) can be used as a measure of its
quality. Hence, the quality qi in the above expression can be replaced by its approximation q^i;k
at iteration k as discussed later in the paper.
It is not obvious a priori how to compute the performance ranking: In the worst case, there
are n! rankings to explore. Fortunately, the performance ranking can be computed efficiently
(in strongly polynomial time) through a reduction to the Linear Fractional Assignment
Problem.
Theorem 1. The performance ranking can be computed in strongly polynomial time.
Proof. We show that the performance ranking problem can be polynomially reduced to the
Linear Fractional Assignment Problem (LFAP). The LFAP, which we state below, is known to
be solvable in polynomial time in the strong sense [19, 20].
A LFAP input is a bipartite graph G = (V1,V2,E) where jV1j = jV2j = n, and a cost cij and a
weight dij> 0 for each edge (i,j) 2 E. The LFAP amounts to finding a perfect matchingMmini-
mizing P
ði;jÞ2McijP
ði;jÞ2Mdij
:
Fig 2. The Quality qi (gray) and Appeal Ai (red and blue) of song i in the two settings. The settings only
differ in the appeal of songs, and not in the quality of songs. In the first setting, the quality and the appeal for
the songs were chosen independently according to a Gaussian distribution normalized to fit between 0 and 1.
The second setting explores an extreme case where the appeal is negatively correlated with the quality used
in setting 1. In this second setting, the appeal and quality of each song sum to 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g002
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To ﬁnd the performance ranking, it sufﬁces to solve the LFAP problem deﬁned over a
bipartite graph where V1 represents the songs, V2 represents the positions, ci,j = −vj(αAi+Di)qi
and dij = vj(αAi+Di). This LFAP instance determines a perfect matchingM such that

P
ði;jÞ2MvjðaAiþDiÞqiP
ði;jÞ2MvjðaAiþDiÞ
is minimized. The result follows since this is a polynomial reduction.
In the following, we use D-RANK and P-RANK to denote the “measure and react” algorithms
using the download and performance rankings respectively. We also annotate the algorithms
with either SI or IN to denote whether they are used under the social influence or the indepen-
dent condition. For instance, P-RANK(SI) denotes the algorithm with the performance ranking
under the social influence condition, while P-RANK(IN) denotes the algorithm with the perfor-
mance ranking under the independent condition. We also use RAND-RANK to denote the algo-
rithm that simply presents a random playlist at each iteration. Our proposed M&O algorithm
is P-RANK(SI).
Under the independent condition, the optimization problem is the same at each iteration as
the probability pi(σ) does not change over time. Since the performance ranking maximizes the
expected downloads at each iteration, it dominates all other “measure and react” algorithms
under the independent condition.
Proposition 1 (Optimality of Performance Ranking). Given specified songs appeal and
quality, P-RANK(IN) is the optimal “measure and react” algorithm under the independent
condition.
Recovering the Songs Quality
This section describes how to recover songs quality in the MUSICLAB. It shows that “measure
and react” algorithms quickly recover the real quality of the songs.
As mentioned several times already, Salganik et al. [8] stated that the popularity of a song in
the independent condition is a natural measure of its quality and captures both its intrinsic
“value” and the preferences of the participants. To approximate the quality of a song, it suffices
to sample the participants. This can be simulated by using a Bernoulli sampling based on real
quality of the songs. The predicted quality q^i of song i is obtained by runningm independent
Bernoulli trials with probability qi of success, i.e.,
q^i ¼
k
m
;
where k is the number of successes over them trials. The law of large numbers states that the
prediction accuracy increases with the sampling size. For a large enough sampling size, q^i has a
mean of qi and a variance of qi(1−qi). This variance has the desirable property that the quality
of a song with a more ‘extreme’ quality (i.e., a good or a bad song) is recovered faster than
those with average quality. In addition, “measure and react” algorithms merge additional infor-
mation about downloads into the prediction as the experiment proceeds: At step k, the approx-
imate quality of song i is given by
q^i;k ¼
q^i;0 mþ Di;k
mþ Si;k
;
wherem is the initial sample size and Si,k the number of samplings of song i up to step k.
Fig. 3 presents experimental results about the accuracy of the quality approximation for dif-
ferent rankings, assuming an initial sampling set of size 10. More precisely, the figure reports
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the average squared difference
Xn
i¼1
ðq^i;k  qiÞ2
n
between the song quality and their predictions for the various ranking policies under the social
inﬂuence and the independent conditions. In all cases, the results indicate that the songs quali-
ty is recovered quickly and accurately.
Expected Market Performance
This section studies the expected performance of the various rankings under the social influ-
ence and the independent conditions. The performance ranking uses the quality approxima-
tion presented in the last section (instead of the “true” quality). Fig. 4 depicts the average
number of downloads for the various rankings given the two settings presented in Fig. 2. The
experimental results highlight three significant findings:
1. The performance ranking provides substantial gains in expected downloads compared to the
download ranking and the random ranking policies. Social influence creates a Matthew ef-
fect [21] for the number of expected downloads. Both plots in Fig. 4 show significant differ-
ences between P-RANK(SI) and D-RANK(SI).
Fig 3. Average Squared Difference of Inferred Quality over Time for Different Rankings. The figure
reports the average squared difference
Xn
i¼1
ðq^i;k  qi;kÞ2
n
between the song quality and their predictions for
the various ranking policies under the social influence and the independent conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g003
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2. The benefits of social influence and position bias are complementary and cumulative. See
the improvements of P-RANK(IN) over RAND-RANK(IN) and of P-RANK(SI) over P-RANK(IN) in
Fig. 4.
3. The gain of the performance ranking is also more significant on the worst-case scenario
(Setting 2), where the song appeal is negatively correlated with the song quality. The ex-
pected number of downloads is lower in this worst-case scenario, but the shapes of the
curves are in fact remarkably similar in the social influence and independent conditions.
In summary, the performance ranking produces significant improvements in expected down-
loads over the download ranking, which also dominate the random ranking. The benefits come
both from position bias and social influence which provide cumulative improvements.
Market Unpredictability
Fig. 5 depicts the unpredictability results using the measure proposed in [8]. The unpredictabil-
ity ui of song i is defined as the average difference in market share for that song between all
pairs of realizations, i.e.,
ui ¼
XW
w¼1
XW
w0¼wþ1
jmi;w mi;w0 j=
W
2
 
;
wheremi,w is the market share of song i in world w, i.e.,
mi;j ¼ Dji;N=
Xn
k¼1
Dji;N
Fig 4. The Number of Downloads over Time for the Various Rankings. The x-axis represents the number of song samplings and the y-axis represents
the average number of downloads over all experiments. The left figure depicts the results for the First Setting and the right figure for the second setting. On
the upper left corner, the bar plot depicts the average number of downloads per sample for all rankings.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g004
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where Dwi;t is the number of downloads of song i at step t in world w. The overall unpredictabili-
ty measure is the average of this measure over all n songs, i.e.,
U ¼
Xn
j¼1
ui=n:
The figure highlights three interesting results.
1. Exploiting social influence does not necessarily create an unpredictable market as shown by
the random ranking and the performance ranking in the first setting.
2. The performance ranking introduces significantly less unpredicability than the download
ranking. This is particularly striking in the first setting where the performance ranking in-
troduces only negligible unpredictability in the market.
3. An unpredictable market is not necessarily an inefficient market. In the second setting, the
performance ranking exploits social influence to provide significant improvements in
downloads although, as a side-effect, it creates more unpredictability. Subsequent results
will explain the source of this unpredictability.
Fig 5. The Unpredictability of the Rankings for the Unpredictability Measure of [8]. The measure of
unpredictability ui for song i is defined as the average difference in market sharemi for that song between all
pairs of realizations, i.e., ui ¼
PW
j¼1
PW
k¼jþ1 j mi;j mi;k j = W2
 
, wheremi,j is the market share of song i in world j.
The overall unpredictability measure is the average of this measure over all n songs, i.e., U ¼Pnj¼1 ui=n:. The
left bar depicts the results for the first setting, while the right bar depicts the results for the second setting.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g005
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Market Inequalities
Fig. 6 reports the inequalities created by the various rankings in terms of the Gini coefficient.
The results show that the performance and download rankings create significantly inequalities.
These inequalities and the associated Matthew effects are more pronounced in the performance
ranking for reasons that are explained below. Informally speaking, the inequalities created by
the performance ranking are directly linked to the efficiency of the market which identifies
“blockbusters”.
Downloads Versus Quality
Figs. 7 and 8 report the correlation between number of downloads of a song (y-axis) and its
true quality (x-axis) for each of the rankings. More precisely, the figures show the distributions
of the downloads of every song over the simulations. The songs are ranked in increasing quality
on the x-axis and there are 400 dots for each song, representing the number of downloads in
each of the experiments. As a result, the figures give a clear visual representation of what hap-
pens in the MUSICLAB for the various rankings, including how the downloads are distributed
and the sources of unpredictability.
The results are particularly interesting. In the first setting depicted in Fig. 7, P-RANK(SI)
clearly isolates the best song, which has an order of magnitude more downloads than other
Fig 6. The Inequality of Success for the Rankings. The success of song i is defined as the market sharemi
for that song, i.e.,mi;k ¼ Di;k=
Pn
j¼1 Dj;k for a given world k. The success inequality is defined by the Gini
coefficientG ¼Pni¼1Pnj¼1 j mi;k mj;k j =2nPnj¼1 mj;k , which represents the average difference of market
share for all songs. The figure depicts a boxplot with whiskers fromminimum to maximum. The results for the
first setting are in black, while the results for the second setting are in red and dashed line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g006
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songs (recall that the y-axis is in a log scale). When comparing with P-RANK(SI) and P-RANK
(IN), we observe that the additional market efficiency produced by P-RANK(SI) primarily comes
from the downloads of this best song. Also striking is the nice monotonic download increase as
a function of song quality. In contrast, the download ranking has a lot more unpredictability
and has significant download counts for many other songs, even for some with considerably
less quality. The variance of downloads for the best song is substantial, indicating that there are
simulations in which this best song has very few downloads. This never happens with the
performance ranking.
The results in Fig. 8 are for the second setting where the appeal is negatively correlated with
the quality: They show that the performance ranking nicely recovers the negative appeal. Once
again, the downloads increase monotonically as a function of quality, which is not the case in
the download ranking or when social influence is not used (e.g., P-rank(IN)). The figure also
highlights the source of unpredictability in the performance ranking. The performance ranking
is not capable of isolating the best song in all worlds: Rather it isolates one of the four best
Fig 7. The Distribution of Downloads Versus the True Song Qualities (First Setting). The songs on the x-axis are ranked by increasing quality from left
to right. Each dot is the number of downloads of a song in an experiment. Note that the y-axis is in log scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g007
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songs. This contrasts with the download ranking where lower-quality songs can have substan-
tial downloads. It is interesting to point out that the unpredictability of the performance rank-
ing in this setting comes from songs which are not easy to distinguish: These songs have very
similar values for quality and appeal.
These results shed interesting light on social influence. First, the download ranking clearly
shows that social influence can transform average songs into “hits”. However, this behavior is
entirely eliminated by the performance ranking in the first setting: The performance ranking
clearly leverages social influence to isolate the “blockbuster”. The second setting highlights a
case where even the performance ranking cannot recover the best song. This setting is of course
a worst-case scenario: A terrific product with a poor appeal. However, the performance ranking
still leverages social influence to promote high-quality songs: Social influence under the perfor-
mance ranking is much less likely to turn an average song into a “hit” compared to the
download ranking.
Fig 8. The Distribution of Downloads Versus the True Song Qualities (Second Setting). The songs on the x-axis are ranked by increasing quality from
left to right. Each dot is the number of downloads of a song in an experiment. Note that the y-axis is in log scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934.g008
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The Benefits of Social Influence
We now prove that social influence always increases the number of expected downloads of the
performance ranking. We show that this is true regardless of the number of songs, their appeal
and quality, and the visibility values. The proof assumes that the quality of the songs has been
recovered, i.e., we use qi instead of q^i;k. Also, for simplifying the notations, we use ai = αAi+Di,t
and assume without loss of generality that v1     vn > 0. Proofs of the lemmas are in Ap-
pendix A.
We are interested in showing that the expected number of downloads increases over time
for the performance ranking under the social influence condition. In state t, the probability
that song i is downloaded for ranking σ is
vsi aiqiP
vsi ai
:
Hence, the expected number of downloads at time t for ranking σ is deﬁned as
E½Dst  ¼
P
ivsi aiqiP
ivsi ai
:
Under the social inﬂuence condition, the number of expected downloads over time can be con-
sidered as a Markov chain where state t + 1 only depends on state t. Therefore the expected
number of downloads at time t + 1 conditional to time t if ranking σ and σ0 are used at time t
and t + 1 respectively is
E½Ds;s0tþ1  ¼
X
j
vsj ajqjP
vsi ai

P
i 6¼j vs0i aiqi þ vs0jðaj þ 1ÞqjP
i6¼j vs0i ai þ vs0jðaj þ 1Þ
 !
þ 1 E½Dst 
   E½Dst :
We ﬁrst consider the case where the ranking does not change from step t to t + 1 and show that
E½Ds;stþ1  E½Dst :
The following technical lemma speciﬁes that the conditionX
i
v2si aj qj  E½Dst 
 h i
 0 ð1Þ
is sufﬁcient for the above inequality to hold.
Lemma 1. If Condition (1) holds, then E½Dstþ1  E½Dst :
Consider the performance ranking now. At step t, the performance ranking finds a permu-
tation σ 2 Sn such that
E½Dst  ¼
P
ivsi aiqiP
ivsi ai
¼max
s
P
ivsi aiqiP
ivsi ai
: ð2Þ
By optimality of the performance ranking at each step, we have that
E½Ds ;stþ1   E½Ds
 ;s
tþ1 :
where σ is the performance ranking at step t + 1.
Corollary 1. Let σ and σ be the performance rankings at steps t and t + 1. If Condition (1)
holds for σ, then E½Dstþ1  E½Dst .
It remains to show that the performance ranking σ at step t satisfies Condition (1). This is
easier to show by reasoning about the playlist obtained by the performance ranking. More
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precisely, at step t, the performance ranking finds a playlist π 2 Sn such thatP
pvpapp qppP
pvpapp
¼ E½Dst  ð3Þ
By (3), π satisﬁesX
p
vpapp qpp  E½D
s
t 
X
p
vpapp ¼
X
p
vpapp qpp  E½D
s
t 
 
¼ 0: ð4Þ
Consider the function
f ðlÞ ¼max
p
X
p
vpapp qpp  l
 
:
Function f is concave and strictly decreasing and hence its unique zero is the optimal value
E½Dst . Furthermore, the optimality condition for π in function f can be characterized by a “re-
arrangement inequality” which states that the maximum is reached if and only if
ap
1
ðqp
1
 lÞ      apnðqpn  lÞ 8l 2 R:
Lemma 2. The performance ranking at step t produces a playlist π satisfying
ap
1
qp
1
 E½Dst 
 
     apn qpn  E½Ds

t 
 
:
Together with Equation (4), this rearrangement inequality makes it possible to prove that
the performance ranking at step t satisfies Condition (1).
Corollary 2. The performance ranking σ at step t satisfies Condition (1).
We are now in position to state our key theoretical result.
Theorem 2. The expected downloads are nondecreasing over time when the performance
ranking is used to select the playlist.
Proof. By Corollary 2, the performance ranking satisfied Condition (1). Hence, by Corollary
1, the expected downloads at step t + 1 is at least as large as the the expected downloads at
step t.
Corollary 3. In expectation, the P-ranking policy under social influence achieves more down-
loads than the any ranking policy under the independent condition.
This corollary follows directly from the fact that the expected downloads at each step do not
change under the independent condition regardless of the ranking policy in use.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper presented a “measure and optimize” algorithm for the MUSICLAB which computes,
at each refresh step, an optimal ranking of the songs, given the appeal, estimated quality, cur-
rent download counts, and position visibility. This performance ranking, which maximizes the
expected number of downloads, can be computed in strongly polynomial time, making the
M&O algorithm highly scalable. Our experimental results reveal two key findings:
1. The M&O algorithm leverages social influence to bring significant benefits in expected
downloads (see Fig. 4).
2. Social influence and position bias both bring improvements in expected downloads and
their effects are cumulative. (See the improvements of P-RANK(IN) over RAND-RANK(IN) and
of P-RANK(SI) over P-RANK(SI) in Fig. 4).
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Our theoretical results formally validate the first finding and prove that the performance rank-
ing under social influence always achieves more expected downloads than any ranking policy
under the independent condition.
Our results shed an interesting and novel light about social influence and the unpredictabili-
ty it creates in cultural markets. The unpredictability coming from social influence is often pre-
sented as an undesirable property of cultural markets. However, as our experimental and
theoretical results show, social influence, when used properly, is guaranteed to help in maximiz-
ing the efficiency of the market. So, unless predictability is a goal per se, social influence should
be seen as an asset for optimizing cultural markets.
Our results also show that, in reasonable settings and with a performance ranking, the un-
predictability created by the use of social influence is small (See Fig. 5). Moreover, the perfor-
mance ranking identifies “blockbusters” and these “blockbusters” are the primary reason for
the increased efficiency of the market (See Fig. 7). There are conditions in the MUSICLAB where
the best song is not recovered and does not have the most downloads. This happens when the
best song has a “bad” appeal and is dominated by another song. Assume, for instance, that we
have only two songs and q1 > q2. If v1 A1 q1 < v2 A2 q2 (v1 > v2), the added visibility is not able
to overcome the bad appeal: Song 1, despite its better quality, will be dominated by song 2.
Note however that these situations can be predicted, since these dominance relationships can
be identified. Equally important, social influence still helps in these settings compared to poli-
cies not using it.
The unpredictability when using the performance ranking comes from songs that are indis-
tinguishable, i.e., Ai qi Aj qj. In this case, social influence may favor one of the songs depend-
ing on how the process unfolds. It is interesting to point out once again that these situations
can be identified a priori. Together with the dominance relationships, these equivalence rela-
tionships helps us identify the sources of unpredictability, i.e., which songs may emerge in the
MUSICLAB. Moreover, it is conceivable that we can also control this unpredictability to ensure
fairness and reduce inequalities. This is a topic we are currently investigating.
Our experiments have also shown that, contrary to the download ranking, the performance
ranking does not transform average songs into “hits”. In reasonable settings, it always identifies
the “blockbusters” (See Fig. 7 on Setting 1) while, in a worst-case scenario where song appeal is
negatively correlated with song quality, it still promotes high-quality songs (See Fig. 7 on Set-
ting 2). There is a certain robustness in the performance ranking which is not present in the
download ranking.
A key insight from this research is the need to leverage social influence carefully. The down-
load ranking uses social influence twice: Directly through the download counts and indirectly
through the ranking. The experimental results indicate that the resulting algorithm puts too
much emphasis on download counts, which are not necessarily a good indication of quality
due to the sampling process. In contrast, the performance ranking balances appeal, quality, and
social influence.
Observe that, in the generative model of the MUSICLAB, the perceived quality of a song is not
affected by social influence: Only the probability of listening to the song is. Our results continue
to hold when the perceived quality of a song is affected by social influence [22–24], e.g., when
the perceived quality of song i is improved by i 0, when song i is downloaded. Similarly, the
results generalize to the case where the sampling probability is given by
pi;kðsÞ ¼
vsiðaAi þ f ðDi;kÞÞPn
j¼1 vsjðaAj þ f ðDj;kÞÞ
;
where function f is positive nondecreasing.
The Benefits of Social Influence in Optimized Cultural Markets
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0121934 April 1, 2015 16 / 20
We hope that these results will revive the debate about the consequences of social influence.
Our results show that social influence is beneficial for the efficiency of the market and that
much of its induced unpredictability can be controlled. It appears that a key issue is to continue
building our understanding of the nature of social influence and to determine how best to use
it and for which purposes: Efficiency, predictability, fairness, . . .
Proofs of the Results
This lemma is important for the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. For any permutation π 2 Sn, we haveP
iuiqpiP
iui

P
iuiq
2
piP
iuiqsi
;
where ui 0 and qi 0 (1 i n).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we rename the songs so that πi = i. Then
0 
X
i>j
uiuj qi  qj
 2
¼
X
i>j
uiuj q
2
i þ q2j  qiqj  qiqj
 
is equivalent to X
i>j
uiujqiqj þ
X
i>j
uiujqiqj 
X
i>j
uiujq
2
i þ
X
i>j
uiujq
2
j : ð5Þ
Renaming indexes of the second terms of both sides yieldsX
i>j
uiujqiqj þ
X
i<j
uiujqiqj 
X
i>j
uiujq
2
i þ
X
i<j
uiujq
2
i
By ﬁxing i, the left side of the inequality can be written asX
i¼1
uiqi
X
j¼1
j6¼i
ujqj
and the right side as X
j¼1
uj
X
i¼1
i 6¼j
uiq
2
i
Therefore, inequality (5) can be expressed asX
i¼1
uiqi
X
j¼1
j 6¼i
ujqj 
X
i¼1
ui
X
j¼1
j 6¼i
ujq
2
j
Adding
P
j¼1u
2
j q
2
j to both sides yieldsX
i¼1
uiqi
X
j¼1
ujqj 
X
i¼1
ui
X
j¼1
ujq
2
j
and hence P
i¼1uiqiP
i¼1ui

P
j¼1ujq
2
jP
j¼1ujqj
:
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Below we present the proofs of Lemma 1 and Corollary 2.
Proof. (of Lemma 1) Let a = a1,   , an represent the current state at time t. For ease of nota-
tion, we rename the songs so that si ¼ i. We also drop the ranking superscript σ from the
download notation. The optimal expected number of downloads at time t can be written as
E½Dt ¼
P
iviaiqiP
iviai
¼ l:
and the expected number of downloads in time t + 1 conditional to time t is
E½Dtþ1 ¼
X
j
vjajqjP
viai

P
i6¼jviaiqi þ vjðaj þ 1ÞqjP
i 6¼jviai þ vjðaj þ 1Þ
 !
þ 1
P
iviaiqiP
iviai
 

P
iviaiqiP
iviai
¼
X
j
vjajqjP
viai

P
iviaiqi þ vjqjP
iviai þ vj
 !
þ 1
P
jvjajqjP
iviai
 
 l:
Proving
E½Dtþ1  E½Dt ð6Þ
amounts to showing that
X
j
vjajqjP
viai

P
iviaiqi þ vjqjP
iviai þ vj
 !
þ 1
P
jvjajqjP
iviai
 
 l  l:
which reduces to proving
1P
iviai
X
j
v2j ajqjP
iviai þ vj
qj  l
 " #
 0
or, equivalently,
X
j
v2j ajqjP
iviai þ vj
qj  l
 " #
 0:
Now there exists a positive constant c> 0 such that
P
j v
2
j ajqj qj  l
 h i
P
iviai þ c
 0 )
X
j
v2j ajqjP
iviai þ vj
qj  l
 " #
 0
which is equivalent to
X
j
v2j ajqj qj  l
 h i
 0 )
X
j
v2j ajqjP
iviai þ vj
qj  l
 " #
 0
and allows us to avoid considering the vj’s in the denominator. By Lemma 3, using the transfor-
mation ui ¼ v2i ai, we obtain P
iv
2
i aiq
2
iP
iv
2
i aiqii

P
iv
2
i aiqiP
iv
2
i ai
 l
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and X
j
v2j aj qj  l
 h i
 0 )
X
j
v2j ajqj qj  l
 h i
 0:
Proof of Corollary 2. At step t, the performance ranking finds a playlist π 2 Sn such thatP
pvpapp qppP
pvpapp
¼ E½Dst : ð7Þ
By (3), π satisﬁesX
p
vpapp qpp  E½D
s
t 
X
p
vpapp ¼
X
p
vpapp qpp  E½D
s
t 
 
¼ 0: ð8Þ
Let π the playlist that corresponds to the ranking σ and let
xi ¼ viap
i
qp
i
 E½Dst 
 
:
Since v1     vn > 0, we have that x1     xn and, by (8),X
i
xi ¼ 0:
Split the xi’s into positive (1, . . ., p) and negative (p + 1, . . ., n) numbers. Then
Xp
i¼1
xi ¼
Xn
i¼pþ1
ðxiÞ
and, since vp vp+1,
Xp
i¼1
vpxi 
Xn
i¼pþ1
vpþ1ðxiÞ
Now, since the vi are decreasing,
Xp
i¼1
vixi 
Xp
i¼1
vpxi
and
Xn
i¼pþ1
vpþ1ðxiÞ 
Xn
i¼pþ1
viðxiÞ
and the results follows.
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